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Christopher Wellman has argued that legitimate states enjoy a right to 
freedom of association that necessarily includes a right to exclude 
immigrants. This paper shows that Wellman’s argument for this conclusion 
is unsound since it is based on a construction of collective rights that is 




This paper is a critical comment on Christopher Wellman’s article ‘Immigration 
and Freedom of Association’ (Wellman, 2008). In that article, Wellman argues that 
a commitment to the existence of a moral right to freedom of association entails 
that legitimate states are presumptively justified in restricting immigration as they 
please. In Wellman’s view, one cannot consistently acknowledge the existence of a 
right to freedom of association and deny a right to block immigration. 
 Wellman’s argument proceeds in two stages. In a first stage, Wellman aims 
to establish that the right to freedom of association grounds a ‘presumptive case’ 
for the justifiability of restrictions on immigration (Wellman, 2008, pp. 109-19). In 
a second stage (Wellman, 2008, pp. 119-37), Wellman argues that this presumptive 
case is not defeated by arguments for open borders that are based on concerns of 
global distributive justice or on libertarian concerns relating to freedom of property 
(Carens, 1987). I will focus exclusively on the first of these two stages (for a 
criticism of the second stage see Wilcox, 2012): My aim is to show that freedom of 
association does not, pace Wellman, ground a presumptive case for the justifiability 
of restrictions on immigration (for previous, partially overlapping criticisms of the 
presumptive case see Fine, 2010; Cole in Wellman and Cole, 2011, pp. 233-60). 
 I will first provide a reconstruction of Wellman’s presumptive case for the 
justifiability of restrictions on immigration. On that basis, I will then offer my 
critique of Wellman’s argument from freedom of association. In a concluding 
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section, I will try to provide a tentative assessment of the significance of the failure 
of Wellman’s presumptive case for the general debate on the justifiability of 
restrictions on immigration. 
 
2. Wellman’s presumptive case for the justifiability of restrictions on immigration 
The presumptive case for the justifiability of restrictions on immigration presented 
by Wellman is, in outline, very simple. We intuitively agree, Wellman plausibly 
claims, that there is an individual right to freedom of association and that this right 
is highly important in a number of social contexts. We believe, for instance, that 
people should be perfectly free to choose who to marry or who to practice their 
religion with. 
Individual rights to freedom of association, Wellman holds, necessarily include 
a right “to reject a potential association and (often) a right to disassociate” 
(Wellman, 2008, p. 110; see also Wellman in Wellman and Cole, 2011, pp. 31-2). 
That I am free to choose who to marry, for instance, entails that I am free to reject 
potential suitors I do not want to marry, and even that I am free to choose not to 
marry at all. Likewise, “if I elect to explore my religious nature in community with 
others”, Wellman points out, “I have no duty to do so with anyone in particular, 
and I have no right to force others to allow me to join in their worship” (Wellman, 
2008, pp. 110). Wellman concurs with Stuart White’s observation that those who, 
by the use of their individual rights to freedom of association, “get together to 
form an association of some kind […] will frequently wish to exclude some people 
from joining their association” (White, 1997, p. 373; cited in Wellman, 2008, p. 
110). Like White, Wellman concludes that individual rights to freedom of 
association would be meaningless if the members of an association did not have 
the right to exclude: “What makes it their association, serving their purposes, is that 
they exercise this ‘right to exclude’” (White, 1997, p. 373; cited in Wellman, 2008, 
p. 110). 
 Wellman admits that the law will sometimes legitimately restrict the 
individual right of freedom of association, so understood. For instance, the law 
may legitimately require an all-white golf club to admit people of color as 
members, or it may legitimately force the boy scouts to admit homosexuals. But 
this shows no more, according to Wellman, than that the right to freedom of 
association is merely presumptive, i.e. defeasible by sufficiently weighty extraneous 
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considerations. However, the presumption itself, Wellman holds, is that members 
of a group are free to exclude others from membership for whatever reason they 
see fit (see Wellman, 2008, pp. 111-2). 
   In a second step of the argument, Wellman claims that collectives, 
including legitimate states, enjoy a right to freedom of association that is perfectly 
analogous to the individual right of freedom of association: 
 
just as an individual has a right to determine whom (if anyone) he or she 
would like to marry, a group of fellow-citizens has a right to determine 
whom (if anyone) it would like to invite into its political community. And 
just as an individual’s freedom of association entitles one to remain single, a 
state’s freedom of association entitles it to exclude all foreigners from its 
political community (Wellman, 2008, pp. 110-1.) 
 
Wellman concedes that this step may seem controversial and anticipates that 
some might deny that collectives possess a right to freedom of association or, as 
Wellman now describes it, of ‘self-determination’, that is analogous to the right to 
freedom of association enjoyed by individuals (see Wellman, 2008, pp. 111-3). To 
deal with this objection, Wellman argues that there are certain moral features of 
states or political communities that would be inexplicable unless states are taken to 
have a right of freedom of association: 
 
consider the moral dynamics of regional associations like the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Union (EU). If 
legitimate states did not enjoy a right to freedom of association – a right 
which entitles them to decline invitations to associate with others – then 
they would not be in a position to either accept or reject the terms of these 
regional associations. Think of Canada’s choice to join NAFTA, or 
Slovenia’s decision to enter the EU, for instance. No one believes that it 
would be permissible to force Canada into NAFTA or to coerce Slovenia to 
join the EU. […] And the reason it is wrong to forcibly include these 
countries is because Canada’s and Slovenia’s right to self-determination 
entitle them to associate (or not) with other countries as they see fit. Put 
plainly, if one denies that legitimate states like Canada and Slovenia have a 
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right to freedom of association, one could not explain why they would be 
righteously aggrieved at being forced into these mergers (Wellman, 2008, pp. 
112.) 
 
In a similar vein, Wellman claims that we would not even be able to explain why 
forcible annexation is wrong if we denied that states have a right to freedom of 
association (see Wellman, 2008, p. 112). To account for the intuition that it would 
be wrong to coerce a state into a merger or federation with some other state or 
group of states, Wellman concludes, we must assume that states, as much as 
individuals, have a right to freedom of association; a right that includes a right to 
exclude immigrants. 
 Wellman holds that this right, like individual rights to freedom of 
association, is deontological. Self-determining states, like autonomous individuals, 
are said to be free to order their own self-regarding affairs as they see fit. The 
presumptive case for the justifiability of restrictions on immigration, Wellman 
claims, does not rest on the communitarian interest in defending ‘communities of 
character’, be they defined by ethnicity, culture, language, or religion (Walzer, 1983, 
p. 62). What we get, supposedly, is a perfectly liberal argument for restrictions on 
immigration (see Wellman, 2008, pp. 116-9). 
 
3. Why Wellman’s presumptive case for the justifiability of restrictions on immigration is unsound 
Wellman argues that if states didn’t have a right to freedom of association, there 
would be nothing wrong with forcing a state to associate with some other state. 
However, it is undoubtedly wrong to force a state to associate with some other 
state. Hence, states must have a right to freedom of association. And if states have 
a right to freedom of association, they must have a right to exclude immigrants as 
they please, since such a right to exclude is necessarily included in the right to 
freedom to association. 
 This argument is unsound for the reason that its last step trades on an 
ambiguity. There are two different ways to understand the notion of a collective 
right to freedom of association, and Wellman does not specify which of these two 
he adheres to. Under one of these two conceptions of a collective right to freedom 
of association – I will call it the ‘individualist construction’ – the right to freedom 
of association would indeed necessarily include a right, on the part of the 
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collective, to exclude any individual that might seek membership, and to do so for 
whatever reason the collective sees fit. The individualist construction, however, is 
not a defensible conception of a state’s right to freedom of association, if there is 
such a right, since it conceives of the relevant collective in ways that conflict with 
the nature of a state. 
The second conception of a collective right to freedom of association – I 
will call it the ‘political construction’ – is a more plausible construction of a state’s 
right to freedom of association. But under this second conception of a collective 
right to freedom of association, the collective’s right to freedom of association 
won’t imply that the collective must also have a right to exclude individuals who 
seek membership, and to do so as it sees fit. It is perfectly conceivable for a state 
to enjoy the right to freedom of association, politically understood, and thus to 
have a right to refuse to associate or to merge with other states, without also 
having a right to block the immigration of individuals as it sees fit. Wellman’s 
argument, in short, ends up in a dilemma: Either the state does not have a right to 
freedom of association, or the right does not imply that a state has the right to 
block immigration at its discretion. 
According to an individualist construction of a collective right to freedom of 
association, a collective’s right to freedom of association is a mere reflex of the 
individual rights to freedom of association enjoyed by its members. These 
individual rights, in turn, are understood perfect freedoms, on the part of every 
individual person, to decide which other individual persons to associate or not to 
associate with. That Wellman conceives of individual rights to freedom of 
association in these terms is suggested by the fact that he uses the example of 
marriage to illustrate the structure and importance of an individual right to 
freedom of association.  
To illustrate the individualist construction of the collective right of freedom 
of association, it is helpful to focus on Wellman’s other example for the 
importance of individual rights to freedom of association, the example of the 
individual right to freedom of religious association. This right is typically used by 
those who possess it, in a liberal society that respects the individual right to 
freedom of religious association, to form religious groups whose normative 
structure reflects the individual rights to freedom of religious association of their 
members.  
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A religious group in a liberal society must clearly enjoy a collective right to 
freedom of association, i.e. a right to decide for itself whether to associate or to 
refuse to associate with some other religious community. That the group must 
have such a right is implied by the individual rights to freedom of religious 
association that its members will enjoy in a liberal society. If the state, or some 
other institution, claimed the authority to force two religious groups to merge, 
against the will of their members, it would violate the individual rights to freedom 
of association of the members of the religious groups in question, since it would 
claim the power to force individuals to be associated, in a religious community, 
with those – in case they oppose the merger – they do not want to be religiously 
associated with. 
Moreover, a religious group in a liberal society must have a right to exclude 
or to refuse to admit any individual that may decide to seek membership, and the 
group must be permitted to do that on whatever ground it sees fit. The group must 
have such a right to exclude for the simple reason that to force the group to admit 
someone whom the current members do not want to be religiously associated with 
would evidently violate the individual rights to freedom of religious association 
enjoyed by the group’s current members in the same way as a forced merger. 
Finally, note that a religious group in a liberal society must have the right to 
expel any of those who are already members, and to do so for whatever reason it 
sees fit. It would violate individual rights to freedom of religious association if 
those who are currently members of one and the same religious community did 
not have a perfect freedom to dissociate, in case they no longer want to belong to 
same community. Whether a process of dissociation is more accurately portrayed 
as an instance of secession or of expulsion will depend on the size of the subgroup 
that decides to dissociate. If that subgroup forms the large majority of current 
members, the result amounts to an expulsion of those from whom the majority 
have decided to separate. The group has a right to expel, then, for the same reason 
that it has a right to exclude or not to admit: All the group’s members enjoy an 
individual right to refuse, for whatever reason they see fit, any future religious 
association with any individual that currently belongs to their religious group. 
 Some might argue that the collective right to freedom of religious 
association, thus understood, is not a genuine collective right at all. After all, its 
effects are completely reducible to the effects of the individual exercise of 
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individual rights to freedom of religious association. We do not have to settle that 
question here. What should be clear, at any rate, is that a state’s right to freedom of 
association, if there is such a thing, cannot possibly be explicated by reference to 
the individualist construction. 
The reason for this is straightforward: While there can be little doubt that a 
state has the right to refuse association with other states, and while it is arguably 
the case that a state has the right to refuse to admit immigrants, it is quite clearly 
false to hold that a state has a perfectly discretionary right to expel those who are 
already citizens. It would appear to be a universally recognized principle that states 
do not have the right to force those who enjoy rights of citizenship to leave the 
territory of the state against their will. What is more, some constitutions make it 
altogether impermissible for citizens to be stripped of their citizenship, and even 
states whose constitutions do, in principle, permit individuals to be stripped of 
citizenship will typically allow for such action only in highly exceptional 
circumstances and for very narrowly circumscribed cause. Certainly, a state’s power 
to strip an individual of citizenship, and then to remove them from its territory, 
could not legitimately take the form of a completely discretionary power, of a right 
comparable to (and resulting from) the individual right of its members to refuse to 
associate with other individual persons as they please.  
However, as long as we adopt the individualist construction of a collective 
right to freedom of association, the right to refuse to associate with another group, 
the right to exclude individuals seeking membership, and the right to expel current 
individual members are logically inseparable, as they are all equally implied by the 
individual rights to freedom of association held by the members of the relevant 
group that ground the collective’s right. If the state does not have a right to expel, 
it therefore follows that the state’s right to freedom of association, assuming that 
there is such a thing, cannot be explicated by reference to the individualist 
construction of the collective right of freedom of association. It must be a right 
that differs in kind from the collective right to freedom of religious association that 
we attributed to a religious group in a liberal state. 
We must therefore consider the possibility that Wellman’s argument might 
be based on a different construction of the collective right to freedom of 
association. The obvious alternative to understanding the state’s right to freedom 
of association is to adopt a political construction of that right. By the use of the 
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term ‘political construction’, I simply mean to refer to the view that a state’s rights 
are rights that inhere in the state as an artificial person, but not in individual 
citizens or in a mere collection or ‘multitude’ of individual citizens.  
By way of example, think of the legislative authority that we attribute to a 
state. Even while a legislator acts on behalf of the citizens who are the addressees 
of the law, no individual member of society, qua individual, and no voluntary 
association of individual members of society can hold a right to legislate. This is 
true even of a voluntary association that so happens to include all members of 
society. Even if all members of a society happened to agree, at some point, on how 
some issue that might need legislative resolution ought to be handled, their mere 
agreement could not bind future dissenters to defect from the consensus. Laws 
made by public authority, by contrast, bind even those who disagree, at least as 
long as they are not formally repealed. The right to legislate, then, cannot be a 
mere reflex of individual rights, like the individualistically construed collective right 
to freedom of association. It must be a right that inheres in the collective but not 
in (any collection of) its individual members. 
A state’s right to freedom of association, if there is such a thing, might 
plausibly be understood in the same way, i.e. it could be conceived of as one 
instance of the right to legislate. In a modern constitutional polity, exercises of the 
state’s right to freedom of association, decisions as to whether the state should 
associate or dissociate with some other state (or a certain class of individuals), will 
typically have to take legislative form. The state’s right to freedom of association, 
then, must be a right that inheres in the public person of the state and not in its 
individual members. 
That the state’s right to freedom of association is to be so understood is, at 
any rate, easy enough to see. Take the case, to go back to Wellman’s own example, 
that Slovenia, exercising its collective right to freedom of association, decides 
whether or not to join the EU. Presumably, that decision is going to be taken 
through a procedure of democratic legislation. But there will almost certainly be 
those who disagree with whatever decision is eventually supported by the majority. 
These dissenters, consequently, will be associated (or not be associated) with the 
EU (and its current citizens) against their own will, given that a valid legislative 
decision binds even those who disagree. If the state’s right to freedom of 
association was a mere reflex of individual rights to freedom of association, the 
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dissenters would have to have a freedom to opt out of the decision, to avoid a 
violation of their individual rights to freedom of association. Dissenting 
individuals, however, evidently have no such freedom with regard to the state’s 
otherwise legitimate decision to associate (or not to associate) with the EU. Hence, 
the state’s right to freedom of association, if there is such a thing, must be political 
in the sense just outlined.  
To put the point slightly differently: Shared citizenship constitutes a 
limitation on individual rights to freedom of association. We do not hold that 
citizens have the right to refuse to associate with or to dissociate from other 
citizens as they see fit; there is no individual right to freedom of civic association. 
It would therefore be a fundamental misunderstanding of the state’s collective 
right to freedom of association, if there is such a thing, to assume that this right is 
grounded in an individual right on the part of each citizen to refuse to share 
membership in the state with this or that other individual (or with this or that 
group of individuals), as an individualist construction would have to have it. 
 If the construction of the state’s right to freedom of association must be 
political, Wellman’s presumptive case will run into trouble. To be sure, a political 
understanding of the state’s right to freedom of association does not by itself entail 
that states do not have the right to block immigration for whatever reason they see 
fit. However, once we adopt the political construction there is no longer any 
reason to think that the state’s purported collective right to freedom of association 
necessarily includes a discretionary right to exclude or to refuse membership to 
individuals who seek it. 
To begin with, the fact that some of those who are already members of the 
state might prefer not to share citizenship with would-be immigrants will no longer 
imply, on a political construction, that the collective must have a right to exclude. 
After all, dissenting citizens will, in any event, have to accept a legitimate decision 
of their own state to associate with some other state that they may not approve of, 
and thus be ready to share citizenship with individuals that they may not want to 
be associated with. They are also, as we have seen, barred from expelling fellow 
citizens that they may prefer no longer to be associated with. Recourse to 
individual rights to freedom of association held by current members of the state, as 
a result, is not available to explain why the collective right to freedom of 
association must include a right to exclude. 
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It might be replied that such an explanation on the basis of individual rights 
is unnecessary, for the reason that all collective rights to freedom of association 
should be presumed to be perfectly similar in content, and thus to include a right 
to exclude, unless there is specific reason to think otherwise. After having 
observed, correctly, that there are some collectives that hold a right to exclude 
individuals, Wellman, in this vein, asserts that those who want to deny that a state’s 
right to freedom of association includes a right to exclude “would owe us an 
explanation as to why the logic of freedom of association does not apply to 
political states as it plainly does in other contexts” (Wellman in Wellman and Cole, 
2011, p. 43). I submit that this challenge has been answered here: If the state’s right 
to freedom of association followed the same individualist ‘logic’ as is exemplified 
in the structure of voluntary associations, like the religious group in a liberal 
society, then the state would have to have a discretionary right not just to exclude 
immigrants, but to expel individuals who are already citizens. But this claim, I trust 
it will be agreed, is patently false.  
The state’s right to freedom of association, moreover, would by no means 
become empty or meaningless if we adopted the view that states have a duty to 
keep their borders open to individuals who want to become citizens (and who are 
willing to assume the relevant duties). After all, even a state that practiced an open 
borders policy would still be free to refuse association or federation with other 
states, and it might still have very good moral reason (as well as perfectly rational 
incentives) to do so. Other states that seek affiliation or federation might have a 
political or economic system that differs from that of one’s own state, for instance, 
one might have concerns about the democratic functioning of political entities that 
are too large, or states might differ in their respective wealth and economic 
development. It is perfectly possible, then, to conceive of the state’s right to 
freedom of association as a right to refuse association or federation not with 
individuals but exclusively with other political collectives. In order to be 
meaningful, such a right needn’t include a right, on the state’s part, to exclude 
individuals who seek membership.    
The public powers of the artificial person of the state, finally, are in any 
event circumscribed by normative considerations. They cannot be deduced from 
assumptions about the essential content of individual rights and rickety analogies 
between individual and collective powers. If the attribution of some power to a 
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state would violate constraints of legitimacy or justice, we should refrain from 
attributing the power. Whether we should attribute a power to exclude immigrants 
to a state, or, put differently, regard that power as included in the state’s right to 
freedom of association, hence, depends on whether such an understanding of the 
state’s right to freedom of association is required by (or can be brought into line 
with) considerations of political legitimacy or justice. To claim that these 
considerations are at best capable to defeat an antecedent right to freedom of 
association that already includes a right to exclude, as Wellman argues, clearly begs 
the question, in light of our analysis. 
In a more recent statement of his argument, Wellman appears to concede – 
though he is not consistent on the point – that a right to exclude is not necessarily 
included in a collective right to freedom of association. He admits that one can 
conceive of a state’s right to freedom of association as including only the power to 
refuse associations with other political collectives, but not a power to exclude 
individuals (see Wellman in Wellman and Cole, 2011, p. 37 and pp. 41-5, but 
compare ibid. pp. 31-2). Nevertheless, Wellman continues to argue that we should 
still take a state’s right to freedom of association to contain a right to exclude; for 
the reason that a right to exclude is required by the principle of political self-
determination: 
 
even if a solitary immigrant would be unlikely to have much of an impact on 
any given state, a sufficient number of immigrants certainly could make an 
enormous difference. And unless a state is able to exercise authority over 
the individuals who might immigrate, it is in no position to control its future 
self-determination (Wellman in Wellman and Cole, 2011, p. 44.) 
 
To illustrate the claim, Wellman offers the following example: Imagine that Russia 
sent a large number of immigrants into Lithuania, who claim entry under a 
principle of open borders, and then has those Russian immigrants, once they have 
reached a majority in Lithuania, vote for Lithuania’s accession to Russia. If one 
agrees, Wellman argues, that Lithuania has a right to defend itself against that fate, 
one must admit that it has a right to restrict Russian immigration, and one is 
consequently committed to the view that the national right to freedom of 
	   72	  
association includes a right to exclude (see Wellman in Wellman and Cole, 2011, 
pp. 44-5). 
 This appeal to the principle of self-determination, on closer inspection, does 
not help very much. The claim that open borders would leave a state in ‘no 
position’ to exercise self-determination is a clear overstatement. More to the point, 
Wellman himself emphasizes that collective rights to freedom of association can 
only inhere in legitimate (i.e. in liberal-democratic) states (see Wellman in Wellman 
and Cole, 2011, pp. 13-9). Collective self-determination, as the power of citizens to 
determine the character of their own state, is thus in any case restricted, since 
appeal to the principle of self-determination, on Wellman’s own view, must fail to 
justify a majority’s choice of a community-character that is not liberal and 
democratic. The argument offered here (and in the next section of this paper), 
moreover, does not rule out the claim that the right to immigrate should be 
conditional on a willingness, on the part of would-be immigrants, to accept the 
constitutional framework of the liberal state into which they immigrate. Given such 
conditionality, an open borders policy would not threaten the liberal-democratic 
character of an open polity. And since Wellman himself adamantly rejects 
communitarian arguments against open borders, he must admit, it would appear, 
that a liberal-democratic character is the only kind of collective character in whose 
preservation a state could take a legitimate interest. It is a little difficult to see, as a 
result, what the restriction of (legitimate) self-determination is supposed to consist 
in that Wellman thinks would result from requiring a liberal state to keep its 
borders open.  
Of course, the Lithuania-example is striking at first sight, but it clearly trades 
on the intuition that it would be bad for a small linguistic or cultural community to 
lose its own state that expresses and protects the community’s own cultural 
identity. That, however, is a communitarian and not a liberal argument against 
open borders. The process described in the example could, after all, conceivably 
take place in a way that does not destroy the liberal-democratic character of the 
polities involved. 
Wellman’s presumptive case, thus, remains stuck in the dilemma outlined 
above: The individualist construction of the collective right of freedom of 
association will imply that the collective has a right to exclude, but this construal of 
the collective right to freedom of association is evidently inapplicable to the state. 
	   73	  
The political construction of the state’s right to freedom of association, on the 
other hand, does not entail that states have a right to exclude. However, that 
construction is perfectly capable to account for the fact that a state must not be 
forced to federate with some other state, as Wellman correctly observes. I 
conclude that Wellman’s presumptive case for a right to exclude is unsound. We 
can hold on to the view that it would be wrong for a state to be forcibly merged 
with some other state, and explain the value of political self-determination, without 
being committed to the claim that legitimate states have a presumptive right to 
exclude immigrants. 
 
4. Implications for the open-borders debate: A duty to provide for citizenship? 
That Wellman’s presumptive case for a state’s right to block immigration is 
unsound does not show, needless to say, that states do not have such a right. Other 
arguments for closed borders may, after all, turn out to work. However, the failure 
of Wellman’s presumptive case draws attention, I believe, to an argument against 
restrictions on immigration that deserves more attention than it has been given so 
far. Let me close by trying to offer a rough sketch of that argument. 
 Recall that Wellman’s presumptive case fails in part because a state does not 
have the right to expel those who are already citizens, or at least no right to do so 
without very good cause. The suggestion I would like to make is that the reasons 
that make it impermissible for states to expel those who are already citizens, or to 
do so without very good cause, may also make it morally impermissible to refuse to 
admit immigrants, at least as long as we are arguing on liberal ground. 
 It is helpful, to get the argument started, to consider why we do not think 
that it is morally problematic for voluntary associations in civil society – such as 
the religious group in a liberal state that we discussed earlier – to wield a 
discretionary right to exclude. We said that the group’s right is required by the 
individual rights to freedom of religious association held by its members. Our 
willingness to attribute such rights to the members of the group, however, would 
appear to be premised on the assumption that, in attributing the resulting right to 
exclude to the group, we do no very serious harm to the interests of those who 
might suffer exclusion. Those who are excluded from some religious group are free 
to form their own religious association, together with those who share their 
personal views as to how religion ought properly to be practiced. In a free and 
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vibrant civil society, it is likely that all individuals are going to find, or else to be 
able to found, a religious group that suits their taste, and thus to satisfy their 
spiritual needs. 
 Clearly, expulsion from one’s state – to be stripped of citizenship and 
potentially removed from its territory – would likely have much more serious and 
potentially detrimental consequences for the expelled (see also Fine, 2010, pp. 345-
52). If someone was stripped of their citizenship and removed from the territory of 
their state, they would not likely be able to found a new state of their own, together 
with others who might share their idea about how to organize a political 
community; if only for the trivial reason that there is no unoccupied territory 
available for founding a new state. What is more, a person expelled from a state, in 
particular in a world of closed borders, may well find herself unable to accede to 
any state other than the one that expelled her. An expulsion from a state, in other 
words, is likely to permanently deprive the person expelled of the benefits of 
membership in a state. 
 The benefits of membership in an adequately functioning state, however, are 
nothing short of crucial for the success of a human life. Those who are deprived of 
citizenship in an adequately functioning state are deprived, for instance, of the 
benefit of living under a rule of law and, to a very considerable extent, of the 
benefit of possessing enforceable individual rights. They will not enjoy sufficient 
protection against crime and external aggression, or be able to rely on a public 
infrastructure of the sort that only a state can provide. Finally, those who are 
deprived of citizenship will not be able to exercise the political powers that will 
tend go along with the possession of citizenship in an adequately functioning state. 
One does not have to be a Hobbesian to agree that to be deprived of all these 
benefits is a very serious harm indeed.    
 These considerations suggest that the benefit of membership in an 
adequately functioning state cannot legitimately be withheld from anyone who is 
willing to assume the legal duties of a citizen. If the reason why expulsion is 
unjustified is that expulsion is likely to result in a person’s being deprived of the 
benefit of membership in a state, then it must be equally unjustified to refuse to 
admit to membership those who do not yet enjoy it, and who have no other means 
to obtain it than to accede to one or another adequately functioning state. 
Adequately functioning states have a moral duty, therefore, to admit those who do 
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not currently enjoy the benefits of membership in an adequately functioning state, 
at least to the extent that they can do so without impeding their own adequate 
functioning.  
Or to put the matter slightly differently: If I am forced to live in state of 
nature, the laws of the states that aim to exclude me cannot bind me. Those who 
are deprived, through coercive policies of exclusion, from the benefit of official 
membership in an adequately functioning state consequently cannot have a moral 
duty to respect the laws that make it illegal for them to immigrate to one or 
another adequately functioning state. But if the would-be immigrants have no duty 
to respect the laws that presume to exclude them, then these laws must be 
illegitimate, and the states that have made those laws cannot have had the right to 
enact them in the first place (see Abizadeh, 2008). 
It might seem as though this argument will show no more than that formally 
stateless persons or refugees have a right to be admitted to some adequately 
functioning state, i.e. to a state that secures the benefits of membership described 
above to all its members on an equal basis (Cavallero, 2014 argues that the claims 
of such persons defeat Wellman’s presumptive case). This overlooks that many 
political entities that are recognized as states in positive international law are not 
adequately functioning, in that they do not manage, or often do not even try to, 
procure the benefits of membership to all their citizens on an equal basis. Those 
who were born into a political condition of this sort are, in effect, suffering from a 
condition of statelessness which they may not be able to remedy in any other way 
than by acceding to an already existing adequately functioning state. At least as 
long as a large part of humanity is forced to live under circumstances that deprive 
them of the benefit of membership in an adequately functioning state, adequately 
functioning states have a duty to admit immigrants who suffer from that condition 
of quasi-statelessness. A closed borders policy would be justified only if all 
members of humanity already enjoyed the benefit of membership in an adequately 
functioning state; a condition from which the real world of international politics is 
very far removed at this point. 
It might be argued in reply that states could legitimately close their borders 
on the condition that they engage in state-building efforts, so as to discharge their 
duty to help those who are excluded from the benefit of membership in an 
adequately functioning state without having to admit them (see Wellman, 2008, pp. 
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126-8). Clearly, such efforts are laudable, and arguably morally required. If they 
were to be fully successful, they would create the conditions that permit for closed 
borders. However, the fact that some adequately functioning state makes an effort 
to help with state-building would not necessarily imply that those who do not (yet) 
enjoy the benefits of membership in an adequately functioning state may now 
legitimately be excluded by that state. The duty to admit will continue to exist for 
as long as there are some who are not yet in enjoyment of the benefit of 
membership and who could be admitted without impediment to the receiving 
state’s adequate functioning. This condition would very likely continue to persist 
for a considerable time even in a world in which adequately functioning states 
made much greater efforts than they currently expend to support state-building. 
What is more, efforts to support state-building may well turn out to be futile due 
to factors not under the control of the supporting state(s). In that case, keeping 
borders open will be the only way to help at least some of those who are unjustly 
deprived of the benefit membership in an adequately functioning state. 
I concede that the conditional argument for open borders offered here is 
open to contestation on the part of communitarian critics. A communitarian 
approach would provide reasons for thinking that it is wrong to expel fellow 
citizens which do not transfer to those who are now excluded and who seek to be 
admitted. The claim would be that we have associative obligations towards the 
former but not towards the latter. Our fellow citizens, it could be said, ‘are family’ 
– they speak our language, practice our religion, have our color of skin, share our 
political-cultural traditions, etc. – while the latter are alien and do not belong to 
‘us’, to the people as defined in pre-legal cultural or ethnic terms. One might go on 
to argue that the preservation of communities that exhibit the fellow-feeling 
characteristic of family is ethically valuable or conducive to the well-functioning of 
a democratic state (see Walzer, 1982, pp. 31-63; Miller, 2005). 
I will not attempt to refute this communitarian challenge here, since I do 
not have to in order to make my point against Wellman. As we have seen, the 
promise of Wellman’s argument for the right to exclude was that it would offer a 
liberal defense of closed borders that need not appeal to the purported good of the 
preservation of ‘communities of character’. Wellman himself forcefully argues that 
it would be wrong for a state to discriminate in its immigration policies on the 
basis of ethnicity or religion, so as to create or maintain social homogeneity among 
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citizens (Wellman, 2008, pp. 137-41). If that liberal approach is taken seriously, we 
seem to be committed to a fairly strong case for open borders. Appeal to the right 
of freedom of association, pace Wellman, cannot ground a liberal argument for 
closed borders in today’s world.  
At the end of the day, Wellman’s presumptive case turns out to be a 
conservative attempt to shift the burden of proof in matters of global justice onto 
the shoulders of those who criticize the status-quo. The failure of his argument 
confirms Juha Räikkä’s warning that, as things currently stand, conservative 
attempts at burden-shifting will tend to prevent justice being done (see Räikkä, 
2005).   
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